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Zeren Langjia, Jian Shi
Terrorism is increasingly threatening world peace and stability, not 
least during the post-9/11 era. In particular, viewed from Europe’s geo-
graphical proximity to areas of conflicts, terrorism is a greater men-
ace to European continental peace, security and stability. As a natural 
consequence, terrorism becomes a top concern of the European Union 
(EU). In practice, it comes to be not merely necessary but also import-
ant to have a better and clearer idea about terrorist landscapes in Eu-
rope so that future counterterrorism will be well grounded in a faith-
ful representation of reality. The authors, drawing upon data selected 
from the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), have categorised the ter-
rorist incidents according to the different scales of casualties, provid-
ed a longitudinal overview of completed terrorism attacks from 1970 
to 2015 with a special focus on the most terrorism-stricken Member 
States (MSs), and statistically analysed the terrorist situation within 
the EU and counterterrorism challenges. In doing so, authors have in-
tention to find the ins and outs of terrorist incidents, to probe the mo-
tivations of perpetrators, and to clarify the faulty generalisations about 
terrorism. The article concludes that an increasingly stronger sense of 
nationalism is emerging, Islamic terrorism is not rising at a dramatic 
speed but in a more destructive way, and more importantly civilians 
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are becoming the dominant target group of terror attacks. It is further 
argued that these three factors are not only the tough challenges but 
also top concerns of counterterrorism.
Keywords: EU, terrorist incidents, perpetrators, challenges, statistical 
analysis.
Terrorism is unprecedentedly challenging regional and global peace, 
security and stability. No one can get rid of it. In particular, Europe’s 
geographical proximity to areas of conflicts explicitly indicates that 
the EU cannot turn a blind eye to terrorism and its causes but instead 
must face it. However, terrorism could be either a touchstone of or 
a stumbling block towards European integration. All depends on how 
the EU and its Member States (MSs) respond to it. In the past few years, 
Europe has experienced consecutive terror attacks that have dramat-
ically increased social tension, but unfortunately no one can predict 
when and where the next attack is going to happen. People feel intense 
uncertainty about their security due to the unpredictability of terror, 
which is further intensified by its multiple and intertwined causes. 
Therefore, historically following the trend of attacks, longitudinally 
collecting terrorist data, and statistically analysing the data come to 
the fore.
To longitudinally collect terrorist data and follow the variation of 
the times can make valuable contributions to better understanding of 
contemporary terrorism. A more direct observation and recognition 
of contemporary terrorism could be drawn through statistical data 
analysis of the variation in the number of incidents. The selected data 
are from a reputable open-source database called the Global Terror-
ism Database (GTD), which includes systematic data on domestic and 
international terrorist incidents and detailed information on the inci-
dents.1 The article is thus developed in an effort to provide an overview 
of the terrorist landscape in Europe, to explore underlying problems 
behind the diverse terrorist acts with a view to clarifying faulty gener-
alisations and viewing terrorism correctly, and to eventually propose 
some possible suggestions for counterterrorist challenges and policies.
To start with, terrorism is a very controversial term to define. As 
various scholars and institutions have attempted to define the term 
Terrorism, its definitions vary from one to another and thus there does 
not exist an agreed-upon definition.2 That said, there are at least 212 
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different definitions of terrorism all around the world.3 These defini-
tions can be further categorised into legal and non-legal definitions 
of the term because non-governmental and governmental institutions 
define terrorism differently. Of all these definitions, the authors’ un-
derstanding of terrorism is grounded in Mareri’s research result of the 
three common elements existing in the legal definitions of the US, 
Britain and Germany: the use of violence, political goals, and causing 
fear and terror in the targeted groups.4 This finding is in consonance 
with the result achieved through a social science approach. Accord-
ing to a content analysis of over a hundred definitions by Schmid and 
Jongman (1988), the three elements are also the top three components 
of terrorism, of which violence emerges in 83.5% of definitions, politi-
cal purpose in 65%, and terror impact in 51%.5 As these two descriptions 
about terrorism are also highly aligned with GTD’s definition of a ter-
rorist attack, which is defined as ‘the threatened or actual use of illegal 
force and violence by a non-state actor to attain a political, economic, 
religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation’,6 the 
authors will consistently employ such definitions throughout the ar-
ticle.
Statistical Analysis of the Number of EU Terrorist Attacks
Data talk. The number of terrorist incidents and their perpetrators 
is an important indicator of terror threats, and to know about them 
is an essential prerequisite of having a good overview of the terrorist 
landscape in Europe. To the end, the GTD database is used consider-
ing its high credibility and information quality. Based on the GTD7, 
the authors collected, categorised and statistically analysed the data 
of terrorist incidents that occurred in EU member states8 from 1970 to 
2015. The data selection is based on three GTD criteria without giving 
a single set definition of terrorism:
1. The act must be aimed at attaining a political, economic, reli-
gious, or social goal;
2. There must be evidence of an intention to coerce, intimidate, or 
convey some other message to a larger audience (or audiences) 
than the immediate victims;
3. The action must be outside the context of legitimate warfare ac-
tivities.
Apart from these criteria, the authors exclude not only all the am-
biguous cases that cannot be ensured to meet all aforementioned cri-
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teria for inclusion as a GTD terrorist incident, but also those unsuc-
cessful attacks that were attempted but not successfully carried out. 
In addition, the GTD database does not include acts of state terror-
ism. Moreover, in order to have a clearer overview of distribution and 
destruction of terror incidents, the casualty scale of single incident is 
grouped into four levels: level I (from one to ten casualties), level II (11 
to 50 casualties), level III (51 to 100 casualties) and level IV (over 100 
casualties). This categorisation of casualty level is conducive to having 
a thorough overview of terror scale on the one hand and is necessary 
for analytical simplicity on the other. 
Based upon such criteria, 2273 incidents can be counted as GTD ter-
rorist attacks in all EU MSs with one casualty at the minimum scale 
in a single incident since 1970. Taking the year 2001 as a watershed in 
contemporary terrorist history, eighty-nine percent of these incidents 
took place before 9/11 while only 11 percent (353) happened during the 
post-9/11 era. In general, there has been a dramatic drop in the number 
of completed terrorist attacks (see figure 1). 
This does not, however, necessarily signal any reduction in the ca-
sualties, attack scale and destruction. Attacks after 2001 are actually 
more lethal when compared with those that occurred during the last 
three decades of 20th century, of which injuries count for the majority 
of the casualties. Another outstanding phenomenon is that the over-
whelming majority of the incidents occurred in Western EU MSs while 
Eastern MSs face much less terror both before and after joining the 
Fig 1 GTD doesn’t have data of year 1993. EU Terrorist Incidents with minimally 
one casualty in each case. There are  2273 incidents. In Western Europe there are 
2052incidents with one to ten casualties and 213incidents with over 10 casualties since 
1970 and in Eastern Europe 8+6 incidents since 2004.
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Union in 2004. Hence, there exists a disparity in casualties between 
Western and Eastern Europe (see figure 2).
Of 2273 incidents, the overwhelming majority of attacks (2059 inci-
dents) belong to level I. Seven percent (166) are with casualties at level 
II. The incidents at this level mainly occurred in the UK, France, and 
Spain, accounting for 37 percent (61), 20 percent (33) and 20.5 percent 
(34) respectively (see figure 3). There are 32 incidents with 51 to 100 
casualties in each case, of which six incidents (19 percent) happened in 
France, 12 (38 percent) in the UK, five in Greece, three (nine percent) in 
Italy and Spain individually, and less than three in other member states 
(see figure 4). From 1973 to 2015, 16 incidents at level IV occurred in all 
member states, seven before 2001 and nine after 2001, of which the UK 
accounts for nine cases (56 percent) (see figure 5). All these 16 major 
attacks took place in the UK, Italy, France and Spain.
There is a dramatic drop in the number of terror incidents before and 
after 9/11. The total number of post-9/11 terrorist incidents is actually 
smaller than that of pre-9/11 ones (figure 1), which corresponds to the 
situations in the most terror-stricken EU MSs (figure 6). The majority of 
terrorist incidents happen in Western EU MSs both before and after 9/11 
(figure 2). The number of pre-9/11 incidents at casualty level 11-50 and 51-
100 is much larger than that of post-9/11 (figure 3 and 4), while the number 
of pre-9/11 incidents at casualty level over 100 is smaller than the number 
of post-9/11 incidents (figure 5). The comparisons have indicated that the 
Fig 2 The number of incidents in each year refers to the total number of the then EU 
Member States (from level II).
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post-9/11 terrorist incidents are more targeted and destructive in terms 
of casualties, though the number gets relatively smaller. The finding is 
helpful to correct the false impression that terror attacks are ubiquitous 
and dramatically increasing. What undeniable is that media coverage of 
terrorism has made much contribution to such an impression, though ter-
rorism should not be underestimated. On the other hand, these variations 
have also reflected that as counterterrorism policies become tougher over 
time, post-9/11 terrorists become more prudent and the terror incidents 
tend to be more well-organised, destructive and imperceptible.
Fig 3 The casualties range from 11 to 50 and here are 166 incidents at this level.
Fig 4 The casualties vary from 51 to 100. These incidents mainly occurred in France, The 
UK, Greece, Spain, and Italy.
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Statistical Analysis of Perpetrators: Member States Case 
Studies
In 1970s and 1980s, Western Europe became the main theatre for ter-
rorist incidents. The main reason for expanding terrorism is ‘its recog-
nition as a form of low-intensity warfare that is safe and cheap to ac-
tivate and dangerous and costly to counter’.9 The number of incidents 
of each category can clearly show the distribution of terror attacks and 
threats in EU MSs before and after 9/11. More importantly, it visualises 
in a very direct way the scale and the seriousness of terror attacks over 
the years. In doing so, the authors assume that these figures can help 
people better perceive terrorist European landscape in an easy way. 
There is a discrepancy between major MSs and others regarding the 
number of terrorist incidents. The overwhelming majority of terror 
attacks are concentrated in the few big MSs. This is the main reason 
why the paper focuses on terrorism in the following EU MSs.
The number of incidents at casualty level 1-10 is quite large, and 
they produce much negative impact on the social order at local and 
regional levels. These attacks are also concentrated in the few major 
MSs. The UK encountered 821 incidents, of which only 84 incidents 
occurred in post-9/11 era. Of the 84 incidents, 18 events produced one 
or two fatalities in each case. Spain suffered from 341 incidents, of 
which 42 incidents result in fatalities ranging from two to five and 117 
incidents cause two to ten (very rare) injuries in each event. Of the 
42 incidents, only three occurred after 9/11. Italy ranks third with 321 
incidents, of which only 18 incidents happened after 9/11 with only 
three events causing one fatality respectively. All 18 incidents that re-
Fig 5 All the major terrorist attacks took place in the western EU member states.
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sult in over two fatalities took place before 9/11. France experienced 
numerous terror attacks with 260 incidents, of which three cases pro-
duced over five fatalities in each case, 22 incidents with two to four 
fatalities, and 95 incidents with one fatality in each event. Relative-
ly speaking, of the five EU MSs, Germany is the least terror-stricken 
country with only 109 incidents, of which eight incidents caused two 
to four fatalities and other 25 events with one fatality in each case. All 
eight incidents happened before 9/11. 
In the MSs’ case studies, all the incidents with at least five casualties 
in each incident are included. The selection is based upon three ratio-
nales: first, to select all the major attacks and main perpetrators from 
the innumerable cases makes it easier to closely analyse the nature of 
terrorist organisations and the possible relationship between different 
perpetrators; second, once the selection criteria are lowered, too many 
incidents have to be included, in which case the perpetrator groups 
are too diverse to categorise, and consequently it is slightly possible 
to designate the complex relationship between them; and third, there 
is not much significance in nuancing perpetrators who mostly launch 
attacks once only with a very few casualties or none.
Spain and its Basque separatist terrorism
Since Spain joined the Union in 1986, four major incidents at level IV 
occurred. It was in 2004 that Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades launched four 
Fig 6 For comparison, the time zone is divided from 1 January 1973 to 11 September 2001 
and from 12 September 2001 to 31 December 2015 in all cases except Spain. 
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attacks in Madrid causing about 200 fatalities and 2000 injuries. From 
1986 to 2015, there are only three incidents at level III, and Basque Fa-
therland and Freedom (ETA) waged all three in 1987, 1991 and 2001; 
during this period, there are 34 incidents at level II, of which ETA ini-
tiated 28 with nine incidents before 9/11 and 19 incidents afterwards. 
Besides this, Terra Lliure was held responsible for two cases, Fatah Up-
rising and Free Galician People’s Guerrilla Army each for one case, and 
perpetrators of the other two cases were ‘unknown’ (i.e., unidentified 
by the GTD). Meanwhile, at level I, ETA were responsible for five of six 
incidents with over five casualties in each incident. 
The ETA, founded in 1959, is the most active nationalist terror 
group in Spain. It was initially founded to fight against General Fran-
cisco Franco’s repression of Basque identity during and after the Span-
ish Civil War and for Basque independence, but ETA ‘lost its  raison 
d’être’ when the country became a democracy in the late 1970s and its 
three Basque provinces gained sweeping autonomy.10 However, having 
believed that Spain’s transition to a democracy is incomplete, radical 
nationalists continue to support ETA’s violence.11 Achieving nation-
hood has become their motivation behind the attacks. ETA is responsi-
ble mainly for pre-9/11 terrorist attacks and Islamic terrorist groups for 
the few latest but lethal incidents. As an armed Basque nationalist and 
separatist organisation in northern Spain and southwestern France, 
ETA commits transnational crimes. The group’s aim shifted from be-
ing originally a purely nationalist organisation to one with a socialist 
Marxist dimension;12 from the initial promotion of traditional Basque 
culture to ‘establishing an independent homeland based on Marxist 
Fig 7 Incident number of each perpetrator in Spain.
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principles and encompassing the Spanish Basque provinces of Vizcaya, 
Guipuzcoa, and Alava, as well as the autonomous region of Navarra and 
the southwestern French Departments of Labourd, Basse-Navarra, and 
Soule’13 through intensive involvements in violent acts such as bomb-
ing, assassinations and so forth. During that time, the ETA repeatedly 
stated that it would only be satisfied with independence.14 With such 
an end, ETA became a paramilitary group, playing an important role 
in the Basque National Liberation Movement and also being an active 
participant in the Basque conflicts.15 
In 1974, the ETA split into two organisations: political-military ETA 
(ETApm) and military ETA (ETAm), of which the latter emphasises the 
incompatibility between politics and armed struggle and is responsible 
for 93 percent of the total killings (832).16 Some ETA supporters, how-
ever, came to doubt its violent methods. They even created a new party 
called EH Bildu and adjured violence.17 In October 2011, ETA group de-
clared a permanent ceasefire and later disbanded. In a statement, ETA 
leaders have expressed that ‘It is now time to close the era of the armed 
conflict (…) to offer all our strength to foment the political process’.18 
Thus, ETA has given way to the Basque peace process and steps upon 
the channels of democratic politics. People credit ETA’s decision on 
abandonment of armed struggle to various factors. Counterterrorism 
efforts from the Spanish and French security forces, a slow but pow-
erful mobilisation of civil society against ETA acts, changes set in mo-
tion within ETA’s political base, and limited but essential assistance 
by international actors have made their contributions to the fading 
and disbandment of ETA group.19 Nevertheless, notwithstanding the 
abandonment of physical forces, the conflicts between Basques and 
Spaniards continue to exist but in different parameters. Nationalism 
is the dominant ideology behind ETA acts, which will not disappear 
but linger. In particular, nationalism recently has tended to increase all 
around the world, and it still needs to be treated in very cautious ap-
proaches so as not to trigger unnecessary conflicts. Right-wing parties 
in various MSs have become increasingly active, the revival of nation-
alism is inevitable and nationalist voice has become stronger in poli-
cy-making mechanisms. Meanwhile, while ETA’s abandon of violence 
could be regarded as a great progress of EH Bildu and as a success of 
counterterrorism, radical nationalists today do have a tendency to use 
physical forces.
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France, its colonial past and Islamic terrorism
Between 1970 and 2015 the only incident at level IV was launched by 
Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) in Paris in late 2015, accom-
panied by three attacks with less magnitude on the same day. Incidents 
at level III occurred six times but all before 1996, of which Armed Is-
lamic Group (GIA) was held responsible for the 1995 and 1996 trans-
portation attacks, Committee of Solidarity with Arab and Middle East 
Political Prisoners (CSPPA) for one against police in 1986, Armenian 
Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) for the 1983 airport 
and aircraft attack, and two unidentified incidents of 1986 and 1982 
against business and media. In addition, 33 incidents at level II took 
place, three by ISIL in 2015 attacking mainly business and private citi-
zens and property, and one raid in early 2015 on journalists, media, po-
lice, private citizens and property triggering off 24 casualties by Al-Qa-
ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). All other 29 attacks happened 
before 9/11, of which one unidentified case was against the military in 
2001 and the others were launched before 1995. GIA was responsible 
for four incidents attacking transportation, educational institutions, 
and government-related officials and institutions in general in 1995. 
Two incidents were credited to CSPPA, ASALA, Action Directe, and 
rightist Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE) individually. Other perpetra-
tors include Hezbollah, Anti-Armenian Organisation, Abu Nidal Or-
ganisation (ANO), Neo-Nazi Group, Popular Front for the Liberation 
of Palestine (PFLP), unaffiliated individual(s), National Movement 
Against the Mahgreb Invasion, Supporters of Right and Freedom, Ca-
ribbean Revolutionary Independence Army, Orly Organisation and 
five unidentified attackers. Apparently, perpetrators are very diverse in 
France, and some such as ISIL, Neo-Nazi and Hezbollah are very trans-
national, but not much evidence shows cooperative linkages between 
these different organisations. Furthermore, there are five cases with 
five casualties minimally at level I: one business attack by unaffiliated 
individual(s), one raid on airports and aircraft by PFLP and three un-
known attacks against transportation and private citizens. 
Pre 9/11, terrorist groups are very diverse, but Islamic terrorists are 
not the dominant groups. Seen from a basic schematic of terrorism in 
France, Action Directe espoused a radical leftist philosophy, ideologi-
cally committing to the overthrow of the capitalist system and to the 
downfall of American-led ‘imperialism’, regional separatist groups ad-
vocated independence of some specific regions of France, and then in-
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ternational terrorism of Middle Easter origin came to public notice.20 
At that time, though various Islamic terrorist groups existed, their de-
structive power was not so high.
As terrorist groups are very diverse, the antithesis between terrorist 
groups is another factor causing conflicts and increasing the number of 
incidents. Some terrorist groups are in complete antithesis to the other 
ones. For instance, rightist BBE came into being to resist against Basque 
separatist ETA, and Anti-Armenian Organisation came into existence 
to put up a stubborn resistance against the violence of ASALA who 
attempted to inflict punishment for the Turkish denial of ‘Armenian 
genocide’.21 These groups are very active international terrorists, com-
mitting transnational crimes. Though they launch attacks in France, 
it doesn’t necessarily mean against French people and civilisation, for 
they also target foreign citizens and especially diplomatic services. For 
instance, ASALA in France is mainly against the Turkish instead of the 
French. Therefore, these terrorist organisations and attacks are closely 
related to age-old racial problems handed down in history.
When it comes to why France is frequently attacked by terrorists, 
people point to multiple factors: its republic’s specific brand of secu-
larism – its model of laïcité (separation between church and state), its 
military interventionism in the Muslim world, discrimination against 
its Muslims, and its colonial history. While without denying the influ-
ence of first three factors, Nougayrède (2016) emphasises the connec-
tions between current terror acts and France’s colonial past, arguing 
Fig 8 Incident number of each perpetrator in France
Note: Perpetrators in France are very diverse.
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that ‘the colonial history is not dead, and it’s not even the past’ and 
‘Nostalgia for French colonial might is still powerful, if unspoken’.22 
The country has to come to terms with its colonial past if an inclusive 
and promising future for all its citizens is in the vision of French poli-
ticians.23 However, on the other hand, Sèbe (2015) argues that ‘trying to 
make sense of the Paris attacks through the prism of colonial history 
only would be dangerously reductive’.24 He believes terrorist attacks 
such as the Paris attacks reflect the self-exclusion of a very small, but 
extremely proactive, minority seeking to alienate communities from 
each other rather than the Gallic marginalisation of Muslim commu-
nities. ‘If the colonial past teaches us how human connections inher-
ited from the empire can have facilitated the implementation of last 
Friday’s attacks [Paris attacks], it is not enough to comprehend the 
dynamics of present-day jihadi groups, which have an unprecedented 
global and fundamentally anti-Western agenda’.25 Unlike anti-colonial 
activists, Jihadi groups are believed to seek to realise their political ob-
jectives at the expense of annihilating the West and its values.26 The 
radical idea actually exposes that Jihadists’ political goals are rooted 
in a zero-sum mentality, that is, either Western values or jihadi funda-
mentalism can exist. 
Meanwhile, French engagement in secularising the Arab world has 
caused much trouble. This is not only an issue in France, but also in 
regions such as North Africa and the Arab world. Internal conflicts 
over secularisation within these regions can be neither denied nor ig-
nored. The conflicts sometimes even expose the inequality between 
secular and non-secular classes. ‘In North Africa in particular, the 
Francophone and predominantly secular classes were clearly preferred 
over their Arabic-speaking counterparts, who frequently favoured the 
concept of a return to an “unspoiled” pre-colonial practice of Islam’.27 
This is also partially a reason why jihadists point to France. France and 
other Western countries have supported authoritarian secular lead-
ers of Islamic states. Thus, Western countries and even Russia, who 
colonised every Muslim country, ‘have a moral, if not absolutely legal, 
obligation both (a) to make reparation to all the peoples in the Middle 
East, and to the Islamic world generally and (b) to foster the rule of law, 
human rights, and democratic institutions in all those states’.28 Though 
current terror attacks cannot be fully attributed to French colonial his-
tory, Islamic secularisation has been highly internationalised due to 
connections established from its colonial past.
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 French terrorist attacks are featured in an increasing share of no-
table Islamic groups stemming from the Middle East regions such as 
GIA, AQAP, ISIL, Hezbollah, PFLP, ANO and CSPPA. The attribute 
certainly gives its credit to its colonial history with regard to under-
standing the French terrorist situation.29 French colonial and control 
power exerts great impact on Muslim countries, such as Algeria, Syria, 
Lebanon, and so forth. France has never completely severed relations 
with these countries and people from these regions come to work and 
live in France. Nevertheless, due to unemployment, educational dis-
advantages and cultural backgrounds, these settlers are marginalised 
and driven to live in some ostracised communities, where the anger 
and dissatisfaction of these people allow their communities to become 
not only the hotbed of Islamic terrorists but also the follow-up forc-
es of Islamic terrorists. As a consequence, the acts arouse the ire of 
French nationalists and citizens that widens the rift between Muslim 
and non-Muslim communities and deepens the racial conflicts. Ter-
rorist groups such as the Algerian-based Islamic Armed Group (GIA), 
the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC), and later al-Qae-
da in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) all ‘blamed France for its colonial 
history and its ties with Algiers’ perceived infidel government’ and 
‘criticized the French for being impious and perverted’.30 The current 
ISIS repeatedly puts much stress upon these essentialist remarks, and 
their rationales for targeting France include its ‘anti-Muslim policies’, 
its military intervention in the Muslim world, and propagandising Ji-
hadi values through creating chaos in French society.31 France is forced 
to pay the price for old problems. Terrorism not only emanates from 
racial problems, but it also deepens racial rifts – a vicious circle.
Last but not least, high proportions of unidentified terrorist at-
tacks are another conspicuously noticeable feature. It indirectly indi-
cates the difficulty in gathering intelligence and tracing perpetrators, 
and the consequential failure of identification becomes undoubtedly 
inevitable; on the other hand, abundant intelligence collecting, and 
successful terrorist identification are the main determinants of pre-
venting and countering future attacks. If security agencies have the 
intention of nipping the terrorist atrocities in the bud, then more ef-
forts need to be made so as to better collect and share information and 
track perpetrators. The fact has also exposed the high invisibility of 
contemporary terror acts.
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UK and threats from Irish republicanism
Since joining the Union in 1973, the UK went through nine major at-
tacks at level IV by the very end of 2015, of which Secret Organisation 
of al-Qaida in Europe (SOQE) claimed responsibility for four aimed 
at transportation explosion in 2005 that gave rise to 56 fatalities and 
around 800 injuries in total and Irish Republican Army (IRA) was held 
responsible for three with one attack in 1973 on the military and gov-
ernment in general, one business attack and one against private citi-
zens and property in 1990s. Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA) made 
one raid on private citizens and property with a result of 29 fatalities 
and 220 injuries in 1998, and one serious airport and aircraft attack, in 
which 270 people died but its perpetrators were unidentified.
The UK also suffered 12 terrorist incidents of level III. Protestant Ex-
tremists launched the latest one in 2013 with opposition against police, 
and it was also responsible for another attack against private citizens 
and property in 1988. IRA waged seven attacks mainly on private cit-
izens, property, business and government with one exception of the 
1984 transportation attack. Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) at-
tacked against business, which caused 16 fatalities and 66 casualties 
in 1982. Moreover, police and business came under attacks from un-
known perpetrators in 1980 and 1991, of which 37 people were killed in 
the former and 70 people were injured in the latter. 
Sixty-one incidents at level II were launched. IRA was responsible 
for 47, of which there were 12 attacks on police, 14 on private citizens 
and property, 12 on business, six on government in general, two on 
transportation, and one on educational institution. Apart from five 
unknown attacks, other perpetrators include RIRA, Continuity Irish 
Republican Army (CIRA) (suspected), Orange Volunteers (OV), Ulster 
Volunteer Force (UVF), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), Protestant Ex-
tremists, Supporters of Qadhafi, PFLP, and Red Flag. All these perpe-
trators committed only once in terms of this casualty scale. Further-
more, at level I eight incidents with over five casualties took place. IRA 
attacked six times with five on police and one on private citizens and 
property. Republican Action Force and UVF were responsible for one 
incident respectively with ten fatalities by the former and five fatalities 
by the latter.
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Of all these attacks, IRA accounts for 70 percent (see figure 9). IRA 
was dedicated to Irish republicanism in the 20th century and for the 
independence of the Northern Ireland. IRA, founded in 1919 during 
the formation of the Irish State, is a nationalist terrorist organisation 
to reunite Ireland through incorporating the six counties of North-
ern Ireland where the majority population is Protestant.32 It has been 
fighting for territorial claim (independence or greater autonomy for 
territory) and thus is involved in a war of attrition with the State, dis-
tinguishing itself from revolutionary, fascist and religious terrorism.33 
For IRA, terrorism was a necessary political instrument to realise its 
ambition. It can attract British and world attention with low cost. As 
IRA has a rival relationship with Loyalists, they take revenge on each 
other through terror attacks. In 1960s, the IRA organisation was al-
most dead, and then some Republican nationalist members split from 
the IRA in 1969 and created the Provisional IRA (PIRA).34 PIRA holds 
divergent political orientations on how to deal with the increasing vi-
olence in Northern Ireland. It had many more killings during 1969 to 
2001, and at the same time repression in Northern Ireland is much 
stronger than in the Basque country (Sànchez-Cuenca, 2007, p. 292). 
The Official IRA (OIRA) as the remainder of the IRA was also active. 
OIRA broke from the PIRA in 1986 because the latter called for an end 
on its abstentionism and RIRA, a 1997 breakaway from PIRA and con-
sisting of members disrupting the Northern Ireland peace process35, 
Fig 9 Incident number of each perpetrator in UK
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has grown into the largest dissident republican organisation. All these 
branches resort to violence under the name of unifying Ireland. Na-
tionhood or statehood sentiment plays a crucial role in sparking off 
IRA-related groups to wage attacks. As a result, the UK Loyalist attacks 
on citizens became a reaction to IRA’s attempt from integrating the 
North Ireland into the Republic of Ireland. Loyalists were engaged in 
‘assassination of republican figures, whether from Sinn Fein or from 
the IRA, or of ordinary Catholics in retaliation for IRA actions and in 
an attempt to force the nationalist community to rein in the IRA’36 to 
terrorise their opponents. That is, wanton slaughter of innocent peo-
ple becomes a political instrument for IRA and Loyalists to win a con-
cession from each other. Consequently, nationalism is locked in a vi-
cious circle of taking revenge. 
Meanwhile, this is also a very religion-based terrorist act. Believing 
that IRA and other IRA-related groups are in doubt to be supported 
by Irish Catholic community, staunchly protestant loyalists37 launched 
attacks on Catholic civilians so as to coerce Irish authorities into aban-
doning their intention of unifying the North Ireland with the Republic 
of Ireland. The IRA’s campaign took place in the context of an ethnic 
conflict between two communities (Catholic and Protestant) divided 
by religion.38 The PIRA has received substantial support from North-
ern Irish Catholics and achieved a great deal regarding its efforts to 
establish a united Irish republic, but it cannot overcome the hostility 
of Northern Irish Protestants to Irish unification.39 Due to the religious 
identity of religious figures and institutions behind the pro-nationalist 
and anti-nationalist movements, religion is naturally and unavoidably 
perceived as an element of the terrorist/counterterrorist relationship.
Attracting media coverage is an objective of terrorists to receive 
international attention and diplomatic recognition. The IRA clearly 
knows that an explosion in London is worth a hundred in Belfast.40 
For instance, on 12 October 1984, the group attempted to assassinate 
Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who was present at the annual 
conference of Conservative Party. On the other hand, in response to 
such an increasing threat of both national and international terror-
ism, the UK government expressed its strong determination and will-
ingness to respond, which ‘has incorporated antiterrorist legislation, 
strong administrative measures, and an outstanding special military 
unit’.41 The reciprocal terrorist/counterterrorist relationship between 
the PIRA and the British authorities has demonstrated that the PIRA 
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systematically adapts to counterterrorist policies pursued by the au-
thorities while the latter correspondingly adopts new counterterror-
ist tactics according to the former’s response.42 Consequently, the two 
parties, instead of resorting to military approaches to defeat one an-
other, seem locked in a ritualistic dance of death, which can never end 
due to the inexhaustibility of their adaptive capability.43 Thus, how to 
balance terrorist and counterterrorist relationship has been and will 
be a challenge.
Later on, the IRA also shifted from resorting to physical forces to 
peaceful approaches. On August 31, 1994, the IRA agreed to eschew 
armed struggle as a means to achieve its political objective of Irish uni-
ty and enter a peace process, but the republican dream of an Irish Ire-
land may remain until it is realised even without the need of physical 
force. As Bell says, ‘The IRA would be different but the same’.44
Since 1980s, Islamic terrorism was already present. Middle Eastern 
terrorist groups carried out several assassinations against dissidents 
living in the UK (such as attacks at the Iraqi embassy, the Libyan em-
bassy and the Iranian embassy).45 After 9/11, Islamic terrorism is in-
creasing. Islamic terrorism is ethnic terrorism. Ethnic terrorists very 
often seek to influence mainly their own constituencies, to foster com-
munal identity, to target potential intermediaries, and also to arouse 
a fear among its rival groups.46 There is no exception for Islamic ter-
rorists. Nevertheless, religious belief is not the direct factor generat-
ing terrorist acts. Some groups of people (e.g., radical extremists and 
nationalists) deliberately create conflicts under the name of religion, 
though different ideologies behind various religions cannot be denied. 
The political intention of these people is much stronger than religious 
motivation regarding the terrorist acts.
Italy and its political violence
Two incidents at level IV occurred in Florence and Bologna, but both 
took place in the 1980s. Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), New Or-
der and Red Brigades together organised an attack on transportation 
causing 15 fatalities and 112 injuries (see figure 5). NAR was also sus-
pected to launch the other major transportation attack in which 76 
people were killed and 188 were injured. There are three incidents at 
level III, of which two attacks with 97 and 80 casualties respectively on 
airports and aircraft were organised by Abu Nidal Organisation (ANO) 
in 1985 and by Black September in 1973 and one transportation attack 
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with 60 casualties by Black Order in 1974; meanwhile, 13 level II inci-
dents happened. Except the unidentified raid on private citizens and 
property in 2003 and the attack on government by Mafia in 1992, the 
remainder occurred during the 1970s and 1980s. Revolutionary Organ-
isation of Socialist Muslims (ROSM) was responsible for one airports 
and aircraft attack and one business attack, ASALA for two airports 
and aircraft concerned cases, and NAR for two attacks on government 
in general. Red Brigades, Black Lebanon and Black Order each are re-
sponsible for one case, and plus two unknown incidents in 1970s and 
1980s. Furthermore, Red Brigades, Mafia and Prima Linea organised 
three incidents at level I with five and over casualties in each case (see 
figure 10). The Red Brigade is also an interesting example connecting 
its rise and fall with political terrorist development.47
Italian terror is mostly characterised by political violence. The ter-
rorist incidents mostly occurred in 1970s and 1980s. The characteristic 
has much to do with the then Italian domestic social instability and 
political turmoil. This period, known as the Years of Lead,48 is marked 
by a wave of epidemic social conflicts and unprecedented political ter-
rorism. Italian society at that time was rife with public protests, la-
bour unrest, student strikes, rampant political violence and the birth 
of various terrorist groups. Moreover, in post-war Italy, ‘[p]olice op-
erations against political protests, often preceded or accompanied by 
“preventive repression”, were shaped by military problem solutions 
Fig 10 Incident number of each perpetrator in Italy
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not excluding the use of firearms’.49 In particular, internal unbalanced 
socio-economic development, the turbulent social situations and ten-
sions between the rulers and the ruled, the crisis of the family that the 
family as a social unit is ‘no longer able to fulfil its function of socializa-
tion’,50 and so forth have deepened conflicts over these issues and ag-
gravated the social crisis. Eventually, all these problems together led to 
the concentrated appearance of numerous terrorist incidents during 
these two decades. Political scandals and corruption triggered violent 
reactions by marginal groups, and the situation is further deteriorated 
due to the crisis in state education, which represents a principal cause 
of intellectual unemployment; dissatisfaction with lack of demand re-
garding educational qualifications gave rise to dangerous frustration; 
unemployment breeds an inborn stimulus, also irrational, towards 
violent behaviour during that time, and the climax in the explosions 
of terrorism took place with the students’ revolt in October 1977.51 All 
these issues are highly intertwined and interdependent. Therefore, 
eliminating domestic socio-economic roots and political roots of ter-
rorism is a prerequisite of tackling international terrorism and its in-
ternational connections. ‘[T]errorism should never simply be labeled a 
political demon or a foreign plot devoid of internal causes’; instead, it 
is mostly ‘a terrible domestic socio-politico-cultural cancer, corrupting 
from the inside any “stagnant” society, incapable of overcoming its in-
ner contradictions and fragility’.52
The then Italian crisis is also believed to have originated ‘in the 
gap between mass aspirations and lack of means, in the weak and col-
lapsing civil infrastructure, and in the ruling class, which is corrupted 
by favouritism and, perhaps, nepotism’.53 According to Santoro et al. 
(1987),54 inter-party conflicts have resulted in much variation in the 
degree to which parties have consensus on the issue of international 
terrorism and thus have stopped Italy from fully cooperating with the 
US and its European partners in the war against terror, though the four 
most prominent political parties stand in principle against terrorism. 
However, the main targeting objects are materials rather than people. 
During that time, an apparent common purpose of terror attacks is to 
overthrow the political institutions of the country.55 In particular, in 
a strange democracy without any alternation of political power and 
few replacements, the forces of the extreme Right and extreme Left 
become ‘a source of ever-increasing tension that explodes in inhumane 
violence against property and people’.56
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Terrorists intend ‘to break up the state by showing that the state is 
incapable both of condemning those who conspire against peaceful 
coexistence and of making the law respected’.57 In doing so, terrorists 
attempt to create a situation of uncertainty or insecurity. When the 
rules and the limits set to regulate behaviours are disrespected and 
the social structure and organisation are undermined, there arises in 
the consociates a widespread phenomenon of contestation of the en-
tire ruling system, which may lead to a situation of uncertainty and 
insecurity.58 As a consequence, people’s reaction to such a situation 
may be distinguished by two forms: one with activity and the other 
with passivity, of which there develops political terrorism in the for-
mer form and there arises self-isolation from society and the passive 
refusal of the social system.59 
Thus, for the country, showing citizens the efficiency of its insti-
tutions is of great significance because vulnerable institutions allow 
the growth and proliferation of terrorist acts on the one hand and cit-
izens, in fear of being retaliated, are unwilling to cooperate with their 
states in struggle against terror on the other hand. It is argued that 
superprisons and increased penalties are not the solutions to the ter-
ror problem; instead, the complete reorganisation and restructuring of 
the state is the solution.60 It is argued that:
When a state can demonstrate the solidity of its own struc-
tures, its capacity for rapidly solving social problems and for 
guaranteeing orderly living conditions, the problem of terror-
ism will automatically be solved; insecurity and tension, which 
are the principal causes of the phenomenon, will be eliminat-
ed and the terrorists will be isolated.61
Deficiency of state institutions weakens the enforcement of coun-
terterrorism. Therefore, the firmness of its institutions, their capacity 
for tackling social problems and ensuring social orders, strong social 
solidarity, and citizens’ confidence in the state’s competence are the 
most important premises to address terrorist issues. Terrorists attempt 
to manipulate and destroy the relationship between public authorities 
and citizens.
The indiscriminate strategy of terror is targeted to sever the tradi-
tional ties of trust and protection between state and people once state 
governments are believed to be unable to combat terrorism without 
resorting to equally indiscriminate violence.62 Hence, serious consid-
erations need to be given to both the strategy of terror and the strategy 
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of counterterrorism. On the one side, indiscriminate counterterrorist 
policies are highly likely to arouse the public’s anger (e.g., the ordinary 
Muslim people), and people will harbour resentment against the state. 
On the other side, indiscriminate strategies of terror cause many casu-
alties that will make people disappointed about the state’s incapability 
of effectively controlling terror. Special attention needs to be paid to 
the strategy of terror as ‘violent action represents the most effective 
system through which a group, small in number and means, may im-
mediately achieve public notoriety’.63 
The outstanding political terrorism can also be observed from the 
Italian institutional response to terrorism. Italian terrorism in 1970s 
was overwhelmingly a phenomenon of the Left, which conceived itself 
as a means of bringing about a Communist regime and regarded its ter-
rorists as the competitors and reformers of the Italian Communist par-
ty.64 During the ‘immobilist’ period (1970-74), the Italian secret service 
protected right-wing terrorism, which was more serious at that time, 
but left-wing terrorism was not considered as a threat; the situation 
changed when the right-wing terrorism declined during the second 
phase (1974-76), and the authorities put more repression on left-wing 
terrorism; the Emergency period (1977-82) was characterised by a new 
wave of left-wing terrorism and mounting repression that eventually 
promoted terrorist recruitment; however, the left-wing terrorism was 
defeated during the fourth period (1982-89) through new anti-terrorist 
policies, such as amnesty and repentance laws.65 
However, unlike rightist groups in the other Western democra-
cies, Italian right-wing terrorism for the most part has been targeted 
at Communists and other leftists rather than racial or ethnic minori-
ties.66 According to the autobiographical literature of Italian terrorists 
on the left and rights, there exists a cultural history of anti-democratic 
violence on both political extremes in Italy, and any endeavour to un-
derstand the problem of Italian terrorism during the second half of 
the last century must start with a historical examination of the ideas 
and values motivating the terrorists. This indicates that the Left and 
Right have conflicting views not only on how to respond terrorism but 
also on how to govern democratic systems. Consequently, inter-party 
conflict is indeed a source of terrorism, but casualties at that time were 
not high. 
Apart from the aspect of overwhelming political violence, Italian 
terrorism is also featured in a broad spectrum of perpetrators and each 
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perpetrator very often carries out a raid once or twice only. This makes 
it difficult to distinguish one terrorist group from another with regard 
to the casualty scale and incident frequency. De facto weakness expos-
es the difficulty in collecting intelligence and identifying terrorist or-
ganisations to light. Like the French case, unidentified incidents make 
up 14 percent of the total, which is quite serious considering the large 
number of casualties of all the unknown incidents. Therefore, intel-
ligence sharing is of great importance in respect of preventing single 
incidents since many perpetrator groups do not commit a second time 
to be discovered.
In recent years, Italy is a country which is ‘experiencing a very weak 
threat, but highly engaged in counterterrorism security operations and 
highly prolific in the anti-terrorism domestic legislative and judicial 
production’.67 Its counterterrorism privileges ‘a comprehensive – and 
not strictly military – response to the terrorist threat’68 so as to effec-
tively control the spread of terrorism.
Terrorist Menace and EU Counterterrorism Challenges
Both terrorist menace and EU counterterrorism challenge are always 
there but come into sight in different ways at different given time. The 
price of destroying terrorism through indiscriminate counterterrorism 
is the disintegration of national social values.69 Counterterrorism thus 
must be carried out in very cautious ways. According to the aforemen-
tioned analyses, terrorist identification through intelligence sharing, 
increasing tendency of Islamic terror attacks and particularly armed 
individuals, and soft target-oriented attacks are some tough threats 
and challenges the EU has to deal with.
Intelligence sharing and terrorist identification
Though the EU and its MSs have spent years of wrangling over intel-
ligence sharing, it is very difficult to make a major breakthrough con-
sidering the divergent and controversial interpretations in MSs. The 
loose cooperation in intelligence sharing consequently results in in-
telligence scarcity both for EU institutions and the MSs. Various cases 
have shown that some attacks, which could be prevented, are success-
fully launched due to a lack of shared intelligence. Hence, closer intel-
ligence cooperation and coordination is supposed to make productive 
contributions to not only identifying and deterring perpetrators but 
also preventing potential attacks.
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An important prerequisite for prevention takes the form of success-
ful intelligence collection before the unpredictable incoming attacks. 
While free movements policies of the EU Schengen Agreement have 
created unprecedented freedom and convenience for European citi-
zens, they concurrently provide favourable conditions for those who 
misuse the policies and commit crimes. In the face of this dilemma, 
closer (police) cooperation in intelligence is one crucial way, if not the 
only way, for the EU institutions and MSs to nip potential menaces in 
the bud. Without intelligence support from national authorities, Eu-
ropean institutions have much trouble moving forward, and so do the 
MSs. 
In particular, given that ‘[i]n the EU terrorists – but not policemen  – 
can move easily across national frontiers’,70 the cooperative necessity 
for intelligence sharing has to be brought to the fore. The extant data 
demonstrates that a considerable proportion of perpetrators cannot 
be identified even after the attacks. The unidentified perpetrators ac-
count for four percent in Spain’s case, 22 percent in France’s case, nine 
percent in the UK’s case, 14 percent in Italy’s case, and 27 percent in 
Germany’s case. These unknown incidents are quite serious with re-
gard to their casualty scale because there are five fatalities or ten casu-
alties (i.e. both fatality and injuries) at the minimum in single incident.
Promoting closer joint cooperation between European institutions 
and the MSs and establishing technical structure of pan-European in-
telligence will make great sense in strengthening national intelligence 
and building up the European level intelligence service. Take the late 
2015 Paris attacks for example. If France, as the leading country, allows 
proactive participation of European institutions and other MSs in the 
investigation after the attacks, both France and other participants will 
be the beneficiaries of investigation achievements to probably prevent 
potential attacks because they could not only exchange information 
but also learn how to better cooperate and coordinate during the inves-
tigation process. It is not merely a way of gathering European institu-
tions and member states together to jointly work on certain issue that 
concerns each party, but a test ground for trust and ‘unity in diversity’ 
between these agents. It is also about ‘technical structure allowing for 
information sharing and joint analysis’.71 By the end of the day, it is also 
an instrumental portion of further promoting European integration.
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Rising destructive power of Islamic groups and ‘lone wolves’
Islamic terrorist groups, particularly ‘Lone Wolves’, were not so ram-
pant in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s. They came into view at the turn 
of the 21st century and 9/11 officially heralded the new but crisis-rid-
den century. Ever since, Islamic terrorist attacks have followed hard on 
another. The Madrid train bombing, 7/7 London Bombings, the more 
recent Brussels Airport Attacks, twice Paris attacks and Nice attacks 
shocked Europe and the world, and more precisely speaking, all these 
aforementioned world-wide known attacks were launched by Islam-
ic groups. For instance, the latest major attacks in Madrid are Islam-
ic-waged incidents; France had been free from any terrorist attacks for 
the past fifteen years until the latest Paris and Nice attacks launched by 
ISIL and AQAP; and the London bombings, which are the only major 
attacks in the 21st century in the UK, were carried out by Secret Organ-
isation of al-Qaida in Europe. These terrorist incidents are not the only 
ones, but they are influential enough to make people feel frozen with 
terror, to enable them to forge a strong psychological line of defence, 
and to discourage them from interacting with Muslim communities, 
which in turn makes it more difficult for people with Islamic back-
grounds to be better integrated into European society or European 
ways of social life that will certainly be detrimental to the smooth inte-
gration development of the Union in general. Islamic terrorist attacks 
are more powerful and destructive than those ethno-nationalist and 
separatist attacks. As a consequence, the peaceful continental paradise 
gets involved into an Islamic terrorist battlefield, and a strong sense of 
insecurity stretches over the continent.
Racial hatred and estrangement between Muslim and non-Muslim 
people is one of the thorniest problems. The outcome of growing Islam-
ic terrorism may even become a Pandora’s Box, inflicting not only great 
harm on European citizens but also tremendous damage on the Euro-
pean social order. Particularly, racial tension is dramatically mounting 
when nationalists and right-wing extremists seize the opportunity to 
stir up troubles. As time passes, the racial chasm is gradually widened. 
This will be a political time bomb on the route to an in-depth Europe-
an integration unless the rift is really psychologically healed instead of 
being deceptively concealed. Meanwhile, it is certainly not a wise act 
either to ostracise and marginalise all the Muslims due to some crimes 
of some particular groups or individuals. Instead, they should be more 
integrated and more middle-of-the-roaders are needed to lessen and 
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possibly minimise bilateral tensions. Porta stresses the importance of 
reintegrating former terrorists involving terrorist organisations into 
society.72 However, former terrorists and their acts differ from contem-
porary terrorists and their activity in many ways. As a result, it will be 
different regarding whether they should be reintegrated into society or 
not. If yes, then the question is how to reintegrate. 
To better integrate Muslim citizens into European society, civ-
il power of Muslim communities and successful European Muslim 
individuals as middlemen could make contributions to bridging the 
gap between radical Muslims (especially the younger generation) and 
European mainstream society. These middlemen could play quite im-
portant roles not only because they are capable of setting a good exam-
ple for the juvenile delinquents or potential terrorists, but also because 
they have closer blood ties and cultural connection with these people 
and can make sense of what is going on there with them. Besides, the 
middlemen are very likely to be the first to have a premonition of a ter-
ror attack and discover the problem, which will render great assistance 
to security agencies to collect incipient signs of terror. Due attention 
has not been paid to this function. They are sometimes forced into 
a situation where they have to cover up for their compatriots and allow 
their crimes when nationalists and other anti-Muslim groups exclude 
and discriminate them on account of their religious or cultural identi-
ty rather than judging the case as it stands. Religion cannot be regard-
ed as the scapegoat of both terrorist and counterterrorist. Drawing 
distinctions between ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ terrorism is problematic 
both at the conceptual and empirical levels because the behaviours of 
so-called religious terrorists is very often indistinguishable from their 
‘secular’ counterparts.73 
Eliminating stereotyped cultural labels is of great importance to 
reduce mutual misunderstanding between ethnic groups. In the case 
of Islamic terrorism, Muslims are dramatically stereotyped, prejudiced 
and demonised ever since September 11. Muslim people are ‘deemed 
responsible for the “crime” of their religious identity, stigmatised and 
labelled as outsiders purely as a result of being Muslim’, and the extant 
studies have found that ‘visible markers of “Muslimness” are connected 
with a rise in the probability of experiencing marginalization, racism 
and issues over access to employment, as well as daily discrimination 
in the form of verbal and even physical assault and violence’.74 Boni-
no argues, ‘the employment of soft approaches aimed at combating 
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and preventing radicalization should be given priority over hard power 
approaches, which could further the isolation, embitterment and tar-
geting of Muslims and, in turn, play into the hands of terrorists and 
recruiters’.75
Another function of civil power in general including all the citizens 
is the role of supervision and harmonisation. It takes the entire society 
to fully advance the peace process of European integration because the 
process per se affects the personal and social interests of all European 
citizens. On the one hand, when it comes to the supervision function of 
civil power, citizens have a say in the matter because different people 
have various access to the information concerned and they could clue 
the police or intelligence service in about suspects or anything suspi-
cious. They could definitely be the extended eyes and ears of intelli-
gence services and more exactly the mobile surveillance cameras. In 
this sense, citizens are more conceived as snitches or informants. On 
the other hand, real social interactions and comprehensive integration 
takes full engagement of all citizens. Respect for being different, pro-
ductive conversations, interaction between cultures and religions and 
so forth are believed to do contributions to establishing a harmonious 
relationship between citizens with diverse backgrounds regardless of 
political orientation, religious belief, cultural belongings, etc. There-
fore, a solution to discovering the initial signs of ‘grassroots jihadists’76 
or potential attackers could be found in a cooperative effort between 
security agencies and the public. 
Terrorism and its increasing soft targets
The landscape of terrorist target types is changing and soft target at-
tacks77 are very likely to be a new normal. Soft target attacks account 
for a remarkable proportion in the cases of Spain, France, Italy and 
the UK. Specifically, among the top ten target types - business, private 
citizens and property, transportation, airports and aircraft, the govern-
ment-related in general count for 27 percent, 21 percent, ten percent, 
ten percent and ten percent respectively while attacks on police make 
up 20% and on the military-related only two percent (see figure 11). 
The soft target attacks’ proportion is about 80 percent as a rough cal-
culation when the attacks on police are fully excluded from soft target 
category.78 Therefore, some preliminary conclusions can be drawn as 
follows.
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Attacks on transportation are very often major incidents and inflict 
the greatest losses with regard to casualties, infrastructure damages, 
social impact and so forth. The major terrorist incidents in European 
cities all attest to the tremendous destructive power of transportation 
attacks. The four Madrid transportation attacks in 2004 by Abu Hafs 
al-Masri Brigades (suspected) led to the serious consequences of 191 
fatalities and about 1800 injuries; the latest four major transportation 
attacks in London in 2005 by SOQE resulted in 56 fatalities and 784 in-
juries; the 1996 and 1995 Paris transportation attacks by GIA (suspect-
ed) are the most deadly incidents before 2015 with an outcome of ten 
fatalities and 177 injuries; and the 1984 Florence transportation attack 
by Armed Revolutionary Nuclei (NAR), New Order and Red Brigades 
gave rise to 15 deaths and 112 injuries; and the 1980 Bologna incident 
by NAR (suspected) resulted in 76 fatalities and 188 injuries. In addi-
tion, the transportation attacks could temporarily paralyse transporta-
tion services but from a long-term perspective make the whole public 
transportation system malfunctioning. Apart from the economic loss-
es and physical damage, transportation attacks, with a high possibility 
of reaching more victims, can maximise the sense of terror and trau-
matise civilians because soft targets instil more fear in the general pub-
lic than hard targets.79 The effect of causing public panic reflects one 
important dimension of the definition of the term terrorism: to spread 
fear and terror among the target groups. Transportation malfunction 
can exert huge impact on citizens and their daily life. Destroying trans-
Fig 11 Terrorist target types
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portation systems often brings much inconvenience for citizens, and 
the inconvenience will increase the publicity of terrorism. The fur-
ther purpose of causing fear is that terrorist groups want the public 
to put pressure on the authorities and let them change the country’s 
foreign policies concerned. As a result, the state will suffer from public 
pressure. For instance, the public opposes military intervention in the 
Muslim world. 
The fact that very few terrorist attacks were against religious figures 
and institutions has demonstrated that more serious considerations 
need to be given to the parlance that religion or religious incompati-
bility is at the root of terrorist incidents. Though the small number of 
attacking religious figures and institutions does not necessarily prove 
that terrorists do not launch attacks based upon religious causes, the 
intertwined relationship between religion and terrorism needs further 
clarification. For a long time, the differences of religious doctrines and 
beliefs are believed to be reasonable explanations for terrorist acts be-
tween religious factions. For instance, the terrorist activities of IRA and 
British protestant loyalists are closely related to religious backgrounds; 
the Islamic terrorist groups even claim themselves to be the real fol-
lowers and practitioners of Islam; and so forth. Nevertheless, there 
are only two incidents in the EU claimed against religious figures and 
institutions since 1970: one is the 1982 Italian case by Black Lebanon 
causing 38 casualties and the other is the 1980 French case by Neo-Nazi 
Group generating 16 casualties. This stark contrast requests security 
agencies and counterterrorism practitioners to further reflect upon 
the delicate interconnectivity between religion and terrorism and to 
see through the false appearances artificially created by attackers for 
the purpose of hiding their bad intentions and distracting people’s at-
tention from finding out the reasons behind their crimes.
The incremental trend of soft target attacks results from both ter-
rorist strategic change and counterterrorism policies. Like the US 
counterterrorism targeting hierarchy groups,80 the EU counterterror-
ism policies and approaches to a large extent manage to block terrorist 
groups or organisations from launching attacks but hardly ward off 
‘Lone Wolf’ attacks. The EU is thereby becoming a victim of its own 
accomplishment. However, ‘lone wolves’ are not really alone. French 
police investigations have indicated that ‘lone wolves’ often retain ties 
with other radicals through the Internet or in real life and are encour-
aged to take up action independently by Jihadis.81 The cultural and geo-
190
CEJISS 
1/2019 
graphical proximity is a big concern of France. Tunisian, Moroccan and 
Algerian nationals, who are reportedly thought to fight in Syria, speak 
French and can be sent to France. What’s worse, French authorities 
have much less capability of controlling these groups of people. Jihadis 
have employed ‘a full spectrum of terror tactics to try and undermine 
France’.82 Nevertheless, due to lacking weapons of mass destruction 
and professional terrorist tradecraft, the armed or semi-armed individ-
uals or so-called ‘Lone Wolves’ are inadequate for attacking hard tar-
gets such as military units and other well-armed forces. Consequently, 
‘in selecting targets, IS appears to prefer soft targets because they are 
more effective than attacks on critical infrastructure, the military, po-
lice and other hard targets’.83 Therefore, soft targets are not only easily 
reached, but also more effective for the attackers to make influence. 
‘Lone Wolves’ actions are most effective when their objects are soft 
targets. When European countries, along with the US, launched a se-
ries of tough crackdown on Islamic terrorist groups, group actions 
decreased. The extant EU counterterrorism strategy has four strands: 
prevent, protect, pursue and respond,84 which is very self-protective 
and conservative, particularly focusing on internal governance and 
security. It is much less possible for terrorist groups to infiltrate the 
Union without being discovered. Even within the Union, group actions 
are increasingly constrained. As a result, terrorist groups recognised 
the necessity of changing their strategy through guiding, training and 
arming potential attackers with essential skills and probably small 
weapons that can render them competent in conducting independent 
but seriously influential attacks. These armed individuals and semi-
armed ones sneak into Europe and freely shuttle to and fro colluding 
with Muslim natives and targeting potential victims. Recently, instead 
of taking the risk of accessing to Europe, they prefer remote control 
over and radicalisation of homegrown terrorists to dispatching attack-
ers to the targeted places. ‘Remote radicalization exploits the growing 
global interconnectivity, its ability to move money, share information, 
and manipulate modern technology’.85 
Conclusion
To conclude, while political violence has decreased, the opposite is 
true for nationalism. Nationalism continues to be a thorny problem. 
The rise of right-wing parties is a sign of the tendency. ETA, IRA, IRA 
branches and many others are very active nationalist terrorist groups 
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which leave a legacy behind. Though both ETA and IRA initiated to 
stop resorting to physical forces as a means to achieve their politi-
cal goals and their intention of quitting physical forces matters very 
much, the underlying nationalist ideologies are still lingering. Some 
right-wing radicals actually tend to use armed struggles, to which spe-
cial attention must be paid.
Islamic terrorism has increased but not in a dramatic way. A big 
challenge is that Islamic terrorism is highly unpredictable, impercep-
tible and destructive. Unlike ETA, IRA and other nationalist groups, it 
will take a much longer time to reach agreement on a peace process 
between Islamic terrorists and European authorities as Islamic issues 
are more sensitive and complex. Islamic terrorist motivations are very 
multiple and overlapping. All political, ideological, religious and ra-
cial themes are intertwined. This makes it very difficult to observe the 
problems. Meanwhile, it is extremely important to distinguish war on 
terror from war against Islam. While national authorities prefer war 
on terror in their political discourse, Islamic terror groups attempt to 
enhance the narrative of war against Islam so as to aggravate contra-
dictions between Western and Muslim worlds.
As terrorists increasingly prefer to attack civilians in a view to at-
tracting world attention, how to protect soft targets and how to main-
tain mutual trust between citizens and the state come to the fore 
regarding counterterrorism. Unarmed civilians are exposed to any 
potential terror attacks, which has been and will be a huge challenge 
to meet. Counterterrorist policies must take into serious account this 
weakness as nobody can guarantee a terror-free society.
Last but not least, how to give a quick response to emergency sit-
uations is another challenge as an increasing number of terror at-
tacks happen without warning. Unpredictability and suddenness are 
the most challenging aspects of counterterrorism. Answers must be 
sought based upon experiences from history and upon predictions for 
future. As people tend to focus merely on the latest terrorist devel-
opments in the world, it is of great importance to take lessons from 
former terror incidents and examine the dynamics of what trans-
pired many years ago. Terrorism is an age-old problem and challenge. 
Counterterrorism will be a long-term undertaking. That ‘terrorism is 
part of daily reality’86 will be a new normal. Many characteristics of 
terrorism remain the same, though some new aspects are increasingly 
emphasised.
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The article suggests that these findings have implications for coun-
terterrorist policies and further academic scholarship. Further research 
should be done to regarding the delicate relations between religion 
and terrorism, the sensitive relations between politics and terrorism, 
and the historical national backgrounds of terrorism, and to make in-
formative sense for counterterrorism decision-making. 
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30 Marc Hecker and Élie Tenenbaum (2017), ‘France vs. Jihadism: The Republic 
in a New Age of Terror’, Notes de l’Ifri, the Institut français des relations 
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